We study con ‡ict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and …nd that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.
Introduction
Consider individuals who are members of one group which competes with another group. Social science has produced strong evidence of 'in-group favoritism', i.e., a more positive attitude or behavior towards members of the same group than towards members of a rival out-group (see, e.g., Brewer 1979 and Bernhard et al. 2006 ). This in-group favoritism emerges even if the 'groups' are not formed on the basis of common characteristics or intrinsically aligned interests, but are simply generated by a random process or by other ad hoc procedures (see, e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979 ). 1 Moreover, con ‡ict with an out-group is likely to strengthen in-group favoritism. 2 Ingroup altruism and spiteful behavior towards members of an out-group is 1 an important dimension for 'in-group favoritism' (see Mifune et al., 2010, for altruism) . We uncover a new reason why a whole set of combinations of in-group altruism and spiteful attitudes towards members of the competing out-group is evolutionarily stable and where in-group altruism and out-group spite are substitutes to each other.
We apply a modi…cation of the equilibrium concept of evolutionary stability for …nite populations, introduced and developed by Scha¤er (1988) . We use and extend this concept in the context of the "indirect approach", i.e., in an environment in which individuals are characterized by their preference types, rather than hard wired actions. Within a …nite population, an individual can improve its own relative standing not only by behavior that increases the individual's own material payo¤, but also by activities that reduce the material payo¤ of other players. Intuitively speaking, this observation is the driving force in Scha¤er's (1988) framework, and it is also the driving force for our results.
Con ‡ict environments in which single players …ght with each other on an individual basis have been well studied both in biology and in economics. For the context with …nite population size, the equilibrium in evolutionary stable strategies in con ‡ict is often characterized by higher …ghting e¤ort than in the standard Nash equilibrium that emerges from simultaneous maximization of material payo¤s (see, e.g., Leininger 2003) . In contrast, we consider an environment in which individuals …ght in groups against each other, and in which each member of a group makes his individual decision about own e¤ort contribution to the own group's total …ghting e¤ort. Hence, con ‡ict between two groups involves a collective good problem within each group: members of the group make contributions that improve the chances that the group wins, and each has potentially an incentive to free-ride on the contributions of other group members. 3 From the perspective of evolutionary …tness, the own e¤ort contributions of a player have several aspects. Own contributions to group e¤ort have a direct e¤ort cost to the player making this e¤ort. They reduce the win probability for the competing group and increases the win probability for the own group. The decrease in the win probability of the competing group is bene…cial for the player, as it decreases the expected monetary payo¤ of members of the competing group. This increases the player's material payo¤ relative to that of the members of the rival group. The increase in the win probability of his own group is a mixed blessing. It increases the own expected material gain of the player. However, the increase in win probability also increases the expected material payo¤ of all other members of the own group (who did not have to bear the additional cost of this e¤ort). In isolation, this latter e¤ect makes the individual less well-o¤ compared to the other members of the own group.
The equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies that results from these partially countervailing e¤ects is the starting point of our main analysis. The main analysis asks whether the combination of in-group altruism and outgroup spite can be jointly established as evolutionarily stable preferences. Formally we adopt the "indirect approach" that considers the evolution of preferences rather than the evolution of actions introduced by Güth and Yaari (1992) in the context of evolutionary game theory. It suggests that -rather than actions being hard wired-individuals may be endowed with objective functions and make optimizing decisions based on their objective functions. These objective functions are genetically determined, but subject to possible mutations and evolutionary selection pressure. This line of reasoning has been used to provide an evolutionary foundation for a number of types of other-regarding preferences. 4 Di¤erent attitudes towards members of the own group than towards members of the out-group may be desirable from an evolutionary perspective. Indeed, our analysis con…rms that a large set of combinations of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences with respect to the competing members in the out-group are evolutionarily stable preferences. This set has the property that in-group altruism and spite toward the outgroup are substitutes.
We make use of a duality relationship that exists between evolutionarily stable strategies (in terms of e¤ort choices) and evolutionarily stable preferences. A suitable mixture of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences towards members of the out-group can implement behavioral choices that are in line with the evolutionarily stable strategies in the direct approach. This duality exists in a framework where we assume that players cannot observe the preference type of their co-players.
Previous research has analyzed several evolutionary explanations for altruism or spite. 5 Altruism or harming or spiteful behavior have been derived and explained by evolutionary arguments in the context of group selection, 6 4 Related to this approach, Frank (1987) highlighted the importance of strategic effects of other-regarding preference traits in strategic situations, and the implications for evolution of preferences. 5 For recent reviews and contributions in evolutionary biology see Lehmann and Keller (2006) , West and Gardner (2010) and Marshall (2011) . 6 Smirnov et al. (2007) , for instance, survey the literature on the willingness to take major risks, including the risk to sacri…ce one's own life. They o¤er an evolutionary expla-and kin selection 7 focussing on relatedness and inclusive …tness. Our explanation does not use any argument that is related to kin selection.
Altruism, spite, and other types of other-regarding preferences have also been shown to be evolutionarily stable in a framework in which players can observe other players' preference types and where they can base their behavioral choices in an interaction with another player on the preference type of this other player. Evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences has generated considerable interest inside economics. 8 An important paper that is closest in spirit to our research question and considers competition between groups is Eaton et al. (2011) who also aim at an explanation of in-group favoritism. They consider a framework which combines two distinct action choices: production e¤ort and appropriation e¤ort in a model of con ‡ict. In-group altruism may develop along one activity dimension and out-group spite may develop along the second activity dimension in this context, and the combination of both types of other-regarding preferences in one model approach nicely addresses the well-documented phenomenon of in-group favoritism. They consider an in…nitely large population and what is sometimes called the 'transparent disposition' approach, in the spirit of Bester and Güth (1998) . The driving force for evolutionary stability of these two types of other-regarding preferences in their context is type observability. In our framework, the combination of in-group favoritism and spiteful behavior toward the out-group emerges from one single activity, and the evolutionarily stability of the combination of in-group altruism and out-group spite emerges, even though other players' types are not observable. In the context of evolutionary biology, a variant of these considerations can be found based on repeated interaction and/or non-additive …tness consequences (see Doebeli 2006, 2009) . A related e¤ect has been studied as the phenomenon of "greenbeards", where altruistic behavior is conditional on relatedness of the recipient (see, e.g., West 2009 and Gardner 2010) . This selective behavior requires that strategies are conditioned on co-players' types; hence, it requires that other players' types are (at least partially) observable. Our approach does not rely on this mechanism nation, based on group selection. Bowles (2009) analyses a related argument, considering whether a group selection argument can be based on the structure and interaction of groups in ancestral hunter-gatherer societies. For a discussion of group selection see, e.g., Sober and Wilson (1998) , and for more critical views Reeve (2000) and Maynard Smith (1998), and Salomonsson (2010) for a recent survey on the group selection controversy. 7 For a survey on altruism and spite in the context of kin selection see West and Gardner (2010) . 8 See, e.g., Güth and Yaari (1992) , Sethi (1996) and does not require observability of type or relatedness.
Our approach has two important key aspects: …rst, we consider …nite population size. This makes the consequences of a player's actions on other players'monetary payo¤ relevant for his …tness. Second, we consider con ‡ict as taking place between two groups that do not cooperate internally. The inter-group competition aspect distinguishes our framework from evolutionary models of con ‡ict between single individuals. 9 It allows us to address the phenomenon of in-group favoritism and the role of out-group competition for this attitude. Also, inter-group competition generates scope for a richer type space, by which the 'type'describes the behavior or the preference towards members of the in-group that can di¤er from the behavior towards the out-group -a complexity that cannot emerge in individual players'contests. 10 Social psychology explained in-group favoritism relating to concepts of social identity and social comparison (see Tajfel and Turner 1979 for an outline) and by the 'realistic group con ‡ict theory' (Sherif et al. 1961 ) as a theory for describing the role of an out-group for in-group favoritism. Recent work traces physiological roots of in-group favoritism using twin studies (Lewis and Bates 2010) and neuroimaging (Mathur et al. 2010 ). Our analysis complements these theories, showing that a genetic underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful attitudes towards the rival out-group proves to be evolutionarily stable.
In the next section 2 we characterize the state game with two rival groups. We then consider evolutionarily stable strategies in the inter-group con ‡ict in section 3. In section 4 we make use of a duality property to show that these evolutionarily stable strategies can be induced by evolutionarily stable preferences that exhibit in-group altruism and spite towards members of the out-group. Then we conclude.
We consider an environment in which a …nite set N of 2n of players i constitutes the set of players who participate in the following state game. 11 The players are partitioned in two alliance groups of equal size, denoted as group A and group B, each consisting of n players. The con ‡ict between the two groups is described by a …ght that is mapped by a Tullock (1980) lottery contest 12 as follows: all players i simultaneously and independently expend an e¤ort x i 0, which is also equal to their material cost of expending this e¤ort. E¤orts of members of the same group sum up to the total group effort, X A = i2A x i and X B = i2B x i , respectively. These total group e¤orts determine the win probabilities for group A and B, respectively. Group A wins the contest with a probability
and with a probability
With the complementary probability p B = 1 p A group B wins the contest. This mapping (1) is often referred to as the Tullock lottery contest success function. If group K 2 fA; Bg wins the contest, each member of the alliance K receives an equal amount Q(n). The members of the losing alliance receive nothing, but have to bear their cost of e¤ort. In general, Q can, but need not be a trivial function of n. For instance, Q = Q 0 =n refers to the one extreme case case where the prize of winning of monetary size Q 0 is a private good that is evenly shared within the group; Q(n) Q 0 refers to the case in which the prize of winning is a group-speci…c public good and all members of the group value the public good symmetrically. Values of Q < Q 0 =n are also feasible and emerge, for instance, if there is some …ghting inside the winner group about how to allocate the prize between them. 13 This setup determines the material payo¤ of a player as a function of his own e¤ort, the e¤ort choices of the co-players with whom he is matched in the given state game, and the outcome of the respective lottery according to (1) . For given 11 The state game here is essentially the static game that is analysed by the literature on inter-group contests, following the tradition of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) . 12 See chapter 2.3 in Konrad (2009) for a survey on the di¤erent …elds (rent-seeking, military con ‡ict, marketing, sports) in which this contest has been developed independently as a tool to describe con ‡ict, for axiomatic foundations such as Skaperdas (1996) , and for a survey on existing microeconomic foundations for this decision rule. 13 See, for instance, Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and Wärneryd (1998) for the analysis of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this context if players care only about their own absolute material payo¤. 6 choices (x 1 ; :::; x 2n )
This material payo¤ consists of the material bene…t which i enjoys if i's group wins times the probability that i's group wins, minus the actual …ghting e¤ort which i contributed to the …ghting e¤ort of his group. This material payo¤ can be interpreted as an expected value if p K is a probability. Alternatively, p K need not be interpreted as a probability of winning, but as a share in the total prize, with the total prize being split between the two groups according to shares p K and (1 p K ). These two interpretations are used equivalently in the rent-seeking literature, if players are risk-neutral. Focussing simply on expected material payo¤, we disregard this possible distinction in what follows.
Evolutionarily stable strategies
We now search for an equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies and ask which x i = x E for all i 2 N is an evolutionarily stable strategy. This implies that we concentrate on the case in which the equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies is a monomorphism, i.e., characterized by a single e¤ort level x E . We assume that mutations from such a monomorphism may happen, but we restrict the types of mutations that can emerge to one single mutant type at a time. That is, starting from a homogenous population in which all players follow the strategy x E , a mutant player may appear who chooses a di¤erent e¤ort x M . We can now provide a de…nition for a monomorphic equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies that rests on the de…nition of stability introduced by Scha¤er (1988) . In this de…nition, the set of material payo¤s of players i 2 N is the determinant of evolutionary success as follows:
where
and x E i is the vector of the e¤orts of all 2n 1 players other than i, who all choose x E .
In words, i (x i ; x E i ) as in (4) is the expected material payo¤ of a player i who chooses e¤ort x i given that all other players choose e¤ort x E , and (5) is the expected material payo¤ of a player who chooses x E if all but one other players also choose x E , and this one other player chooses e¤ort x i . This one other player may belong to the same group as player i, which happens with a probability n 1 2n 1 and to the rival group with a probability n 2n 1 . De…nition 1 is taken directly from Scha¤er (1988) . It formalizes the standard idea of evolutionary stability, but for a …nite population. A population which consists of players who all follow the strategy x E is evolutionarily stable if it cannot be successfully invaded by a mutant who chooses a mutant strategy x M = x i . According to this de…nition, suppose there is a mutant playing x i . If this mutant has a strictly higher payo¤ than the average payo¤ of the non-mutants who all choose x E , then this violates the property that x E is a solution to (3), and this mutant does better than the average player in the group of non-mutants. Due to the association in groups, the mutant belongs to one of the groups and plays against a homogeneous group consisting of players who all choose x E . This in turn yields di¤erent material payo¤s to the non-mutants, depending on whether they are in the same group as the mutant, or in the rival group.
The …rst-order condition 14 for a maximum of (3) evaluated at x i = x E yields
and total e¤ort per group is equal to
Qn 2n 1 .
We summarize this as 14 Note that the second derivative of i (
is strictly negative for all possible values of x E > 0, and that the …rst marginal unit of e¤ort x at x = x E = 0 has a positive impact on the value of i (
Theorem 1 A symmetric equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies of the inter-group contest is described by e¤ort choices
This result shows that the evolutionarily stable strategy is increasing in Q and decreasing in the size of the total population. For instance, if Q(n) = Q 0 (the pure public goods case), individual contributions converge towards zero as the population size becomes very large. However, total contributions of each group converge towards 1=4. 15 If Q = Q 0 =n (the pure private goods case), individual contributions and total group e¤orts converge to zero as n ! 1.
Evolutionarily stable preferences
We can now consider evolutionary stability in the context of the evolution of preferences, in line with the indirect approach introduced by Güth and Yaari (1992). A player's material payo¤ relative to other players' material payo¤s determines evolutionary success. However, rather than considering evolutionary strategies (…xed e¤ort choices in the context here) and their evolutionary success, we allow players to di¤er in their subjective utilities, assuming that the players consciously maximize their subjective utility by their choices of actions, as in a strategic game. Players'types will be de…ned based on their subjective preferences and their beliefs about the preferences of others. Mutations and evolutionary selection then operates on the set of possible preference/belief types.
To be more speci…c, in each state game there is, again, a set N of players i. The players are randomly partitioned into the two groups A and B. Each player has a set of possible strategies x i 2 [0; 1) and chooses freely from this set. All players' choices are made simultaneously, and the two aggregate group e¤orts enter into the contest function and determine which of the groups wins with a prize Q. This prize is allocated to each member of the winning group, just as described in section 2. The de…nition of material payo¤ of players also remains as in (2) . Players do not necessarily maximize this material payo¤, however. Instead, each player has a 'subjective utility', where this utility function characterizes an individual's 'type'. We later ask which subjective utility is evolutionarily stable -with a de…nition of evolutionarily stable utility given further below. We are interested in the possible role of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences towards the members of the out-group. Therefore, we consider the following parametric version of subjective utility of player i in group A as a function of material payo¤s of all players,
where i is i's own material payo¤, the second term is the sum of the material payo¤s of all players who are in the same group as i, and the third term is the sum of material payo¤s of all players who are in the other group. Further a i 0 and s i 0 are the utility weights given to the monetary payo¤s of other in-group players j 2 Anfig and out-group players in set B. A strictly positive value of a i measures i's in-group altruism, a strictly positive s i measures spiteful feelings vis-à-vis members of the rival, out-group B. The space of possible subjective utilities for members of group B is de…ned analogously. Accordingly, the preference type of a player i is determined by a pair (a i ; s i ).
To complete the description of the state game, we have to specify the information assumptions and players'beliefs that apply. Players'preference types are private information: each player knows his own type, but not that of others. Players cannot observe the preference type of other players, but nevertheless need to have or form beliefs about other players'types. Together with a player's preference parameters, the player's beliefs are part of the characterization of the player's type. We …rst de…ne robust beliefs. De…nition 2: Suppose player i 2 N has preference parameters (a i ; s i ). This player's belief about his co-players'types is a robust belief if i beliefs that all other players j 2 N nfig are also of preference type (a i ; s i ) with probability 1.
In what follows we assume that all players have robust beliefs as de…ned in De…nition 2. Hence, a player's type is fully characterized by a pair of preference parameters (a i ; s i ), and beliefs about other players that are identical with the player's own preference type.
We note several properties of robust beliefs. First, in a monomorphism of evolutionarily stable preferences all players have the same preference parameters. It follows directly that players' beliefs are consistent with the true distribution of types in each evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Beliefs are incorrect whenever the population N consists of individuals with di¤erent preferences, i.e., outside a monomorphism of evolutionarily stable preferences. These two properties are important and nice features of robust beliefs.
They can be seen as the evolutionary-equilibrium analogon to the requirement in Bayesian Nash equilibrium that beliefs must be correct along the equilibrium path -but not for out-of-equilibrium outcomes.
Second, robust beliefs allow to solve for what we call the symmetric robust-beliefs Nash equilibrium e¤ort of each player type, for any given true distribution of types among all other players. In fact, for robust beliefs, the player has a dominant choice and can be characterized as follows. Let x i = (x i ; x i ; :::; x i ) be the vector of e¤orts in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of mutually optimal replies if all players are of type (a i ; s i ) and maximize (7) . Then the dominant choice that maximizes (7) for player i given his preferences (a i ; s i ) and his robust beliefs is x i = x i . This implies that, should all players are of the same type (a i ; s i ), they end up with e¤ort choices (x i ; x i ; :::; x i ). Should some players have di¤erent preference parameters, the e¤ort choice of player i of type (a i ; s i ) is still uniquely determined and equal to x i = x i , for any possible type (a i ; s i ).
Note that, for a set of players with heterogenous preference parameters, this choice behavior will not be ex post optimal, as the players are surprised about the e¤ort choices by others. However, such surprises occur only out of the equilibrium in evolutionarily stable preferences. Note also that the assumption of robust beliefs and the players'choice behavior that is implied is convenient for the formal analysis, but does not drive our results. Our main result does not rely on this choice of beliefs. 16 The assumption of unobservability of types is a major departure from the evolutionary literature on altruism. Observability of preference types is frequently assumed in the context of the indirect approach, starting with Frank (1987) . Type observability has strategic implications: a player's type may induce the equilibrium actions of co-players, and a change in a player's type can therefore cause a change in co-players equilibrium actions. As has been shown by Bester and Güth (1998) , the direction of this strategic e¤ect of a player's own type for co-players'actions is crucial for the evolutionary success of particular preference traits, including altruism. With observed altruism or spite parameters, these induce a strategic e¤ect on other players: other players' optimal e¤ort choices become a function of the preference type of player i, as they anticipate that player i's e¤ort choice depends on i's own preference, and di¤erent choices x i induce di¤erent optimal replies for other players. We depart from this observability assumption, because the assumption of observability is a strong and empirically less plausible assumption, and because the strategic e¤ect of type observability is known and well understood. This also implies that our …ndings on evolutionarily stable altruism and spite are not based on this strategic e¤ect.
We now ask which combination of (a E ; s E ) is an evolutionarily stable type in the following sense. Let all 2n 1 players be of type (a E ; s E ) and let one individual i be of type (a i ; s i ). If (a i ; s i ) 6 = (a E ; s E ) we call this individual i a mutant. Evolutionary stability of preferences in the line of reasoning of Scha¤er (1988) is a property about the relative advantages of this preference type given the uniform preferences of all other players. Suppose that 2n 1 players follow subjective utility maximization according to a given type characterized by (a E ; s E ). Let there be a single mutant with (a i ; s i ) di¤erent from (a E ; s E ). Let i ((a i ; s i ); (a; s) E ) be the material payo¤ obtained in the robust-belief Nash equilibrium by the mutant if the mutant and all other players maximize their own subjective utilities and have robust beliefs, where (a; s) E denotes the vector ((a E ; s E ); :::; (a E ; s E )) of preference types of all individuals other than i. Further, let i ((a; s); (a; s) E ) be the material payo¤ obtained in this equilibrium by each of the other 2n 1 players who maximize their own subjective utilities and are of type (a E ; s E ). An adaptation of Scha¤er's stability criterion for evolutionarily stable preference types then is as follows: 
Using this de…nition we can now state our main result:
Theorem 2 Let P = f(a; s) a 0 and s 0 and a = 1 (2n 1)(n 1) n (n 1) s g. Then each (a; s) 2 P constitutes an equilibrium in evolutionarily stable preferences with robust beliefs.
Proof. Let us denote the (2n 1)-dimensional vector of x j = x E for j 6 = i as x E i . We make the following three observations: Observation 1 : Let (a E ; s E ) 2 P. Suppose all individuals have these preference parameters and robust beliefs. In this case
x j = 1 4 Q 1 + a(n 1) + sn n y for all j = 1; :::,2n
is a set of mutually optimal replies. We call this a Nash equilibrium with robust beliefs.
To con…rm this observation, suppose that some player i anticipates that all other players choose this e¤ort y, i.e. x E i = (y; :::; y). In this case, player i with preference parameters (a i ; s i ) chooses an e¤ort that maximizes
This maximization problem has a unique interior solution at x i = y, as can be shown as follows. From
it follows that @U i ((a; s); x E i )=@x i is strictly positive at x i = 0 and strictly decreasing in x i . The non-zero symmetric solution is x i = y where y is given in (9) .
Observation 2 : The set of (a i ; s i ) that implements e¤ort choices y = x E (= 1 2 Q 2n 1 ) in the symmetric Nash equilibrium with robust beliefs is characterized by a i = 1 (2n 1)(n 1) n (n 1) s i . For Observation 2 to be true it must hold that x E = y, or 1 2 Q 2n 1 = 1 4 Q 1+a i n a i +s i n n . Solving this for a i as a function of s i yields a i = 1 (2n 1) (n 1) n (n 1) s i : Observation 3 : Consider a possible mutant player i in a population in which all other players j 6 = i have preference parameters (a E ; s E ) 2 P . By Observation 1, choices of players j 6 = i are given by x i = x E i , independent of the actual preference parameters of player i. Given this behavior of other players, consider player i and his material payo¤. Theorem 1 revealed that the e¤ort choice that maximizes i's evolutionary …tness in this case is x i = x E . Accordingly, the set of preferences (a i ; s i ) that maximizes i's material payo¤ in the preference domain is equal to the set of preferences (a i ; s i ) that induce x i = x E given x j = x E for all other j. Observations 1 and 2 revealed that all (a i ; s i ) 2 P induce this e¤ort choice. This concludes the proof. Theorem 2 is our main result. It shows that there is a whole set of combinations of preference parameters that, if all individuals have these preferences, the symmetric Nash equilibrium with robust beliefs induced by these subjective utilities has e¤ort choices that are the same as the evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategies that were characterized in Theorem 1. The function a E (s E ) = 1 (2n 1) (n 1)
describes the set of pairs (a E ; s E ) that constitute evolutionarily stable preferences. Evolutionary stability therefore allows for a number of combinations of in-group altruism and spiteful attitudes towards the members of the outgroup. The function (10) also shows that more in-group altruism comes together with less spiteful behavior towards the out-group: in-group altruism and spite towards members of the out-group are substitutes as regards a E (s E ). Furthermore, as the group size n becomes large, in-group altruism and out-group spite become less pronounced. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship for n = 2, n = 3, and n = 5, with the weight for altruism a E in (7) on the y axis, and the weight s E measuring spite in (7) on the x axis. The intuition for this negative relationship is as follows. Starting from a situation along the frontier a E (s E ), if a player has higher altruism towards the members of his group, in isolation this induces the player to make higher contributions to group e¤ort. In comparison to the evolutionarily stable e¤ort choices in Theorem 1, this e¤ort choice is "too high". In order to bring the e¤ort that maximizes the player's subjective utility back in line with the e¤ort level that is characterized in Theorem 1, an appropriate reduction in spiteful behavior towards the members of the rival group is desirable, as a reduction in s will reduce the e¤ort that maximizes the player's subjective utility.
It is important to note that the evolutionary stability of in-group altruism and out-group spite in Theorem 2 has a di¤erent, and new reason, compared to the approach taken by Frank (1987) , Bester and Güth (1998) and others. That a player is an altruist in this framework does not induce a behavioral reaction by other players that bene…t the altruist. This 'strategic e¤ect' channel is the basis for evolutionarily stable behavioral attitudes in many other analyses, but this channel is closed in our framework by the assumption of robust beliefs. Whether a player is an altruist or not does not a¤ect the e¤ort choices of all other players if they have robust beliefs. Given their beliefs, all other players are essentially guided only by their own preference parameters. Nevertheless, in the evolutionary equilibrium, the beliefs about other players'types and about their e¤ort choices are perfectly consistent.
Out of the evolutionary equilibrium, with robust beliefs, players may have the wrong perceptions about the types of their co-players and need not anticipate their e¤ort choices correctly. This emphasizes the absence of a strategic e¤ect of the 'type'. A mutant who enters into an otherwise homogeneous population does not induce them to make di¤erent choices. An inconsistency of this concept seemingly is that the mutant has 'wrong' beliefs about the preferences of the population which he tries to invade and does not correctly anticipate other players'e¤ort choices in this case. But as the state game is a single shot game, there is no way the mutant can learn, update beliefs and adjust behavior. Moreover, for the evolutionary stability of elements of the preference set P, the speci…c belief of the mutant about the other players' types is not important. This can be con…rmed as follows. Suppose that, unlike in the proof of Theorem 2, the mutant with preference parameters (a; s) assumes that all other players are of preference types (a E ; s E ), and as mutations are extremely rare, these other players believe that all players in N are of preference type (a E ; s E ). In this case it turns out that again the set of preference parameters in the set P constitute the set of preferences that ful…ll the criterion of evolutionarily stable preferences in De…nition 3.
Conclusions
In this paper we show that in-group altruism together with out-group spite can be explained as being the preference parameters of evolutionarily stable subjective utility in a framework with two groups which …ght with each other. This result provides an evolutionary explanation for the strong ingroup favoritism that is empirically well established for groups that are in con ‡ict with other groups. We have also seen that spite and altruism are substitutes in the functional relationship that describes the full set of evolutionarily stable preference types, and that the role of altruism and spite is more important the smaller the groups are. For very large groups the amount of spite and altruism that is evolutionarily stable converges to zero. These comparative static properties about the role of group size yield an empirically testable hypothesis about in-group favoritism.
In order to address unobservability of types in an evolutionary context we introduced a new concept of belief types: robust beliefs. This concept is compatible with a stochastic and unobserved change in the distribution of types in the population, and still allows for the beliefs to be consistent in the equilibrium of evolutionarily stable strategies.
We note, however, that our results on evolutionary stability are not driven by this framework of beliefs. It is also important to note that the evolutionary argument that supports in-group altruism and out-group spite here is di¤erent from some of the arguments that have been used to provide an evolutionary foundation for altruism between individuals. First, the foundation here does not depend on considerations of kin-selection, or even of groupselection. To demonstrate this, we may allow for a complete re-grouping of the members (or their descendants) of the two groups between one state game and the next, without altering the analysis or the results at all. Second the argument does not build on strategic behavioral e¤ects that might emerge if preference types are observable by others. This channel by which altruism and other types of other-regarding preferences have been established previously is strictly closed here by the unobservability of types.
